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The Rule of Insurable Interest and the Principle of 
Indemnity: Are They Measures of Damages in 
Property Insurance? 
EMERIC FISCHER* 
An _insurance contract has been defined as an agreement between two 
or more parties in which one party, the insured, pays a specific sum to 
the other, the insurer, in exchange for the latter's indemnification for 
losses incurred as a result of certain risks, contingencies or occurrences 
specified under the contract.t For such an agreement to be judicially en-
forceable, the insured must have an insurable interest2 in the property 
insured. The rule of insurable interest3 has developed to eliminate the 
• B.S. 1952, University of South Carolina; J.D. 1963, M.L. & T. 1964, College of William 
and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law. 
1 There are numerous definitions of insurance-judicial, legislative and encyclopedic. 
One early English court defined insurance as "a contract by which the one party in con-
sideration of a price paid to him adequate to the risk, becomes security to the other that he 
shall not suffer loss, damage, or prejudice by the perils specified to certain things which 
may be exposed to them." Lucena v. Craufurd,127 Eng. Rep. 630, 642 (1805) (Lawrence, J.l. 
New York offers this legislative definition of insurance: 
The term 'insurance contract' ... shall ... be deemed to include any agree-
ment or other transaction whereby one party, herein called the insurer, is 
obligated to confer benefit of pecuniary value upon another party, herein called 
the insured or the beneficiary, dependent upon the happening of a fortuitous 
event in which the insured or beneficiary has, or is expected to have at the 
time of such happening a material interest which will be adversely affected by 
the happening of such event. A fortuitous event is any occurrence or failure to 
occur which is, or is assumed by the parties to be, to a substantial extent 
beyond the control of either party. 
N.Y. INS. LAW§ 41 (McKinney 1966). One commentator offers another definition: 
In a general sense, "insurance" is a contract to pay a sum of money upon the 
happening of a particular event or contingency, or indemnity for loss in 
respect of a specified subject by specified perils; that is, an undertaking by 
one party to protect the other party from loss arising from named risks, for 
the consideration and upon the terms and under the conditions recited. 
G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW§ 1:2 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1959) (footnotes omit-
ted). 
• This article does not document the lengthy and tortuous development of the concept 
of insurable interest. For excellent discussions of this topic, see Harnett & Thornton, In-
surable Interest in Property: A Socio-Economic Reevaluation of a Legal Concept, 48 
COLUM. L. REV. 1162 (1948); Pinzur, Insurable Interest: A Search for Consistency, 46 INS. 
CouNSEL J. 109 (1979); Note, Insurable Interest in Property: An Expanding Concept, 44 
IOWA L. REV. 513 (1958). 
' One definition of insurable interest, currently recognized and accepted is that: 
[A] person has an insurable interest in property whenever he would profit by 
or gain some advantage by its continued existence and suffer some loss or 
disadvantage by its destruction. If he would sustain such loss, it is immaterial 
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element of wagering from insurance contracts. At common law, wager-
ing contracts were enforceable,4 and wagering contracts on marine 
cargo5 and individual lives6 were not abolished until 1746 and 1774, 
respectively.7 As to property insurance, specifically fire insurance, 
wagering contracts were not legal even before 1746.8 Saddler's Co. v. 
Badcock9 offers the explanation. In that case, Lord Hardwicke indicated 
that fire insurance does not have the history or attributes of marine in-
surance and that an insurable interest must exist in the insured if he is 
to recover .10 
Insurance contracts are aleatory contracts, that is, the insurer need 
perform only if a condition occurs. To that extent the insurance contract 
is contingent upon the chance of an event. That is not to say that an in-
surance contract is a wagering contract. A wagering contract is founded 
upon chance, not upon the chance of an event; it creates its own risk-
win all or lose all. An insurance contract is founded upon dispersion of a 
risk"- the insured transfers a large risk for a small cost. He is not seek-
ing a gain; he wants to avoid a possible future loss. Thus, the require-
ment of an insurable interest is the distinguishing element between a 
whether he has, or has not, any title in, or lien upon, or possession of, the prop-
erty itself. 
G. CoucH, supra note 1, § 24:13 (footnotes omitted). 
' See R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 90 (1971); S. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF INSURANCE 96 (American ed. 1805). 
5 See S. MARSHALL, supra note 4, at 100. 
• Id. at 672. 
7 Wagering contracts on marine insurance were initially declared illegal by the Act of 
1746, 19 Geo. 2, c. 37, and wagering contracts on life insurance were declared illegal by the 
Act of 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 48. The preamble to the Act of 1746, 19 Geo. 2, c. 37, reads: 
Whereas, it hath been found by experience, that the making assurances, in-
terest or no interest, ... hath been productive of many pernicious practices, 
whereby great numbers of ships ... have ... been fraudulently lost ... and by 
introducing a mischievous kind of ... wagering, under the pretence of assur-
ing the risque on shipping, ... the institution and laudable design of making 
assurances hath been perverted .... 
The gist of the operative words of the statute is that "no assurance ... shall be made by 
any person . . . on any ship . . . by way of gaming or wagering . . . and ... every such 
assurance shall be null and void to all intents and purposes." ld. § 1. The Act of 1774, 14 
Geo. 3, c. 48, § 1, provides: 
Whereas it hath been found by experience, that the making insurances on 
lives . . . wherein the assured shall have no interest, hath introduced a 
mischievous kind of gaming ... after the passing of this act, no insurance shall 
be made by any person ... on the life ... of any person .. _ wherein the person 
... for whose ... benefit ... such policy ... shall be made, shall have no in-
terest, or by way of gaming or wagering; and ... every assurance made, con-
trary to the true intent and meaning hereof, shall be null and void, to all in-
tents and purposes whatsoever. 
• See notes 9-10 & accompanying text infra. 
• 26 Eng. Rep. 733 (1743). 
•• "Now these insurances from fire have been introduced in later times, and therefore 
differ from insurance of ships, because there interest or no interest is almost constantly in-
serted .... " Id. at 734 (emphasis added), quoted in S. MARSHALL. supra note 4, at 701. 
11 R. KEETON, supra note 4, at 2. 
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wagering contract and an insurance contract. Although insurance con-
tracts are seemingly wagers, the concept developed that if there is an 
interest in the subject insured which is independent of the occurrence of 
the risk, then there is no wager. The authorities, however, are divided 
on the question of what relationship between the insured and the sub-
ject of insurance will produce an insurable interest. One view holds that 
there must be a legal relationship or property interest which a court of 
law or equity will recognize and enforce. Another view subscribes to the 
factual expectations theory under which an insurable interest exists 
when a person profits by the continued existence of a thing and would 
suffer some loss by its destruction whether or not he has any legal in-
terest in it.12 These two views crystallized in the famous cause of Lucena 
v. Craufurd, 13 Lord Eldon arguing for the former view and Judge 
Lawrence favoring the latter.14 For a time, all jurisdictions relied upon 
12 This view comports with one well-recognized definition of insurable interest. See note 
3 supra. The factual expectations and legal relationship theories are discussed at length in 
Pinzur, supra note 2, at 111-16. 
13 127 Eng. Rep. 630 (1805). 
" To illustrate his argument, Lord Eldon gave the following example: 
Suppose A. to be possessed of a ship limited to B. in case A. dies without 
issue; that A. has 20 children, the eldest of whom is 20 years of age; and B. 90 
years of age; it is a moral certainty that B. will never come into possession, yet 
this is a clear interest. On the other hand, suppose the case of the heir at law 
of a man who has an estate worth 20,000 [pounds] a-year, who is 90 years of 
age; upon his death-bed intestate, and incapable from incurable lunacy of mak-
ing a will, there is no man who will deny that such an heir at law has a moral 
certainty of succeeding to the estate, yet the law will not allow that he has any 
interest, or anything more than a mere expectation. 
Id. at 652. 
Judge Lawrence explained his view this way: 
That a man must somehow or other be interested in the preservation of the 
subject matter exposed to perils, follows from the nature of this contract, 
when not used as a mode of wager, but as applicable to the purposes for which 
it was originally introduced; but to confine it to the protection of the interest 
which arises out of property, is adding a restriction to the contract which does 
not arise out of its nature. 
Id. at 643 (emphasis added). 
United States courts have also taken sides in the Eldon-Lawrence argument. In Farmers 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. New Holland Turnpike Co., 122 Pa. 37, 15 A. 563 (1888), the insured had a 
policy covering a public bridge. Destruction of the bridge would cause pecuniary loss to the 
insured since travelers could not use its toll road. The court denied recovery to the insured, 
saying that "all the definitions of an 'insurable interest' import an interest in the property 
insured which can be enforced at law or in equity." Id. at 46, 15 A. at 565. That definition is 
consistent with Lord Eldon's legal relationship theory. 
On the other hand, in Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Bolling, 176 Va. 182, 10 
S.E.2d 518 (1940), the court ruled in favor of the insured even though she had no legally en-
forceable right in the property insured-she was a mere tenant at suffrance. The court 
said: "To hold that she had no pecuniary interests in continuing this business upon which 
she depended for support because she had no legal title is to stick in the bark. She was not 
only interested, she was vitally interested; her living hung upon it •... " Id. at 190, 10 
S.E.2d at 521. For an excellent discussion of the contrasting views of Lord Eldon and Judge 
Lawrence, see Pinzur, supra note 2, at 112-15. 
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judicial determinations of what constituted an insurable interest; during 
the past century, however, state legislatures have been codifying the 
meaning of insurable interest.15 Most of these codifications adopt the fac-
tual expectation test.16 
Regardless of the view subscribed to, all authorities hold that property 
insurance is a contract of indemnityP Unfortunately, no universal agree-
ment exists as to the meaning of the word indemnity, either conceptual-
ly or definitionally.18 This lack of uniformity encourages the divergence 
15 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 66.3205(2) (1980); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 367(b) (1979); 
N.Y. INS. LAW§ 148 (McKinney 1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 48.18.040 (1961). 
10 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.§ 56·2405(2) (1977); VA. CODE§ 38.1·331 (1976). Virginia defines 
insurable interest as "any lawful and substantial economic interest in the safety or preser-
vation of the subject of insurance free from loss, destruction or pecuniary damage." Id. 
Although CAL. INs. CoDE§ 282 (West 1972), would lead one to believe that California is 
also in the ranks of the followers of Judge Lawrence, the succeeding section, id. § 283, is 
more in accord with Lord Eldon's legal relationship theory. Section 283 provides: "A mere 
contingent or expectant interest in anything, not founded on an actual right to the thing, 
nor upon any valid contract for it, is not insurable." For a listing of other states adopting 
the legal relationship theory, see Pinzur, supra note 2, at 125. 
17 R. KEETON. supra note 4, at 94; E. PATTERSON. ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 137 (2d 
ed. 1957); G. RICHARDS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE§ 24, at 29 (3d ed. 1909); W. 
VANCE. HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 160 (3d ed. B. Anderson 1951). One authority 
has commented on the nature of the property insurance contract: "At the very outset it 
must be noted that insurance is essentially a contract of indemnity, and that from this car-
dinal principle arise many of its distinctive characteristics, such as the rule requiring an in-
surable interest .... " G. RICHARDS, supra, at 27-28 (footnotes omitted). Richards noted fur-
ther that "[t]he doctrines of indemnity and of the necessity of an insurable interest are cor-
relative and complementary in all branches of the law of insurance," id. at 29 (footnotes 
omitted), and concluded that "[n]o matter how large the amount of insurance, the recovery 
is restricted to the loss actually sustained," id. at 30. 
18 Keeton's version is expressed in the following language: "The principle that insurance 
contracts shall be interpreted and enforced consistently with this objective of conferring a 
benefit no greater in value than the loss suffered will be referred to in this book as the prin-
ciple of indemnity." R. KEETON, supra note 4, at 88 (emphasis added). On the other hand, 
Vance states that "[u]nder the strict principle of indemnity, the actual value of the subject 
of insurance is always the limit of recovery." W. VANCE, supra note 17, at 102 (emphasis 
added). Patterson seems to question the nature of the indemnity aspect of insurance when 
he states: "If, and to the extent that, any particular insurance contract is a contract to pay 
indemnity, the insurable interest of the insured will be the measure of the upper limit of his 
provable loss under the contract." E. PATTERSON. supra note 17, at 109. Apparently, Keeton 
thinks of indemnity in terms of financial loss because he refers to it as "loss suffered," R. 
KEETON, supra note 4, at 88, whereas Vance, by referring to the "subject of insurance," 
treats the concept in terms of the physical value of the property. W. VANCE, supra note 17, 
at 102. Patterson takes an intermediate approach, speaking in terms of "provable loss." E. 
PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 109. 
Crisp v. Security Nat'! Ins. Co., 369 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. 1963), illustrates another approach. 
In discussing indemnity where the insured property was household goods, the court stated: 
Indemnity is the basis and foundation of insurance coverage not to exceed 
the amount of the policy, the objective being that the insured should neither 
reap economic gain nor incur a loss if adequately insured . 
. . . The measure of damage that should be applied in case of destruction of 
this kind of property is the actual worth or value of the articles to the owner 
for use in the condition in which they were at the time of the fire excluding 
any fanciful or sentimental considerations. 
Id. at 328 (emphasis added). 
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of decisions in determining the quantum of damages when a property 
loss occurs. Although the definition of an insurable interest and its in-
demnification are interrelated/9 the nature of the relationship between 
the subject insured and the insurable interest2Q does not necessarily af-
fect the limit of recovery for losses incurred. 
This article examines the wide variety of decisions involving in-
surable interests and indemnification and the question of whether the 
principles of insurable interest and indemnification determine the quan-
tum of damages. To maintain a semblance of organization, the analysis 
will be compartmentalized according to legal relationships or issues. 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN LIMITED INTEREST SITUATIONS 
Life Tenant and Remainderman 
In the marketplace, the value of a terminable interest is established 
either by actuarial longevity tables if, for example, a life estate is in-
volved, or by the term of the interest if a lease is involved. Thus, if a life 
tenant and a remainderman sell a parcel of real estate in fee, the selling 
price will be apportioned between the sellers according to the actuarial 
value of the present interest and the future interest. Several courts 
have held that if property so held is damaged or destroyed, the life ten-
ant, according to strict principles of indemnity, may only recover the 
value of his interest and not the value of the property, even if the in-
surance contract covered the fee value and premiums were paid accord-
ingly.21 However, the Michigan court in Convis v. Citizens' Mutual Fire 
Insurance Co. 22 strongly rejected this conclusion. It pointed out that the 
present monetary value of the insured's life estate would be insufficient 
to rebuild the destroyed building and, therefore, an award limited to 
that amount would "virtually destroy the use of her life-estate."23 The 
insurance company had insured the property for its fee value knowing 
•• See notes 17-18 supra. Harnett and Thornton observed: 
The general statement that insurance is traditionally a contract of indemnity 
is significant in determining the measure of an insured's recovery, for the at-
tempt is always to evaluate the insurable interest and the impairment of it 
through the occurrence of the insured event. Having then ascertained loss in 
terms of economic impairment, that impairment becomes the measure of 
recovery. 
Harnett & Thornton, supra note 2, at 1176. 
20 The insurable interest might, for example, be a fee simple, term of years, equitable 
lien or legal title for security. For a more extensive list of property relationships which may 
give rise to an insurable interest, see Pinzur, supra note 2, at 119-20. 
•• See, e.g., Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Michael, 167 Ind. 659, 79 N.E. 905 (1907); Beekman v. 
Fulton & Montgomery Counties Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 66 A.D. 72, 73 N.Y.S. 110 
(1901). 
22 127 Mich. 616, 86 N.W. 994 (1901). 
23 Id. at 623, 86 N.W. at 997. 
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that it was the insured's homestead for life, that she was entitled to the 
use of the property and that she would be entitled to the full amount of 
the insurance proceeds so that she could rebuild her home should it be 
destroyed. According to the court, the insurer's defense that, because 
the insured had only an interest in the life estate, she should be unable 
to recover more than the value of that interest, was "technical and 
without merit."24 
Home Insurance Co. v. Adler25 involved an even stronger claim for 
complete compensation. In Adler, the life tenant died in the fire, nine-
teen minutes after it had begun. The insurer admitted that had the life 
tenant survived the fire she would have been paid the full damage within 
the policy since the same premium is paid by an insured with a fee in-
terest as by an insured with a life interest. Nevertheless, the insurer 
vehemently argued that since she died during the fire, she had a de 
minimis loss since· she had no insurable interest the moment after 
death. The court held that since she was alive the moment the fire 
started, liability attached in her favor at that moment for the full 
damage caused by the fire.26 
Where the instrument creating the life tenancy requires the life ten-
ant to keep the property insured, it has been held that the proceeds of 
insurance must be used either to rebuild the property or to be kept at 
interest.27 If the proceeds are used to rebuild the property, the re-
mainderman will ultimately succeed to the property, and, if the pro-
ceeds are invested, he will succeed to the fund. Where there is no duty 
imposed on the life tenant, nor any agreement between the life tenant 
and remainderman that the life tenant keep the premises insured, the 
"' ld. Similar reasoning was used in Merrett v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 42 Iowa 11 (1875). 
In Houck v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 198 N.C. 303, 151 S.E. 628 (1930), and Welsh v. 
London Assurance Corp., 151 Pa. 607, 25 A. 142 (1892), the courts used estoppel to prevent 
the insurer from denying liability for the full value of the destroyed property. The life ten· 
ant became a trustee for the remainderman as to the excess of the judgment over the value 
of the life interest. Presumably, rebuilding the property would discharge the entire obliga-
tion of the life tenant. More recently, most states have held that a life tenant can recover 
the full replacement value within policy limits. See E. PATTERSON & W. YOUNG, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON INSURANCE LAW 191 (4th ed. 1961). 
25 269 Md. 715, 309 A.2d 751 (1973). 
26 /d. at 721, 309 A.2d at 754; cf. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Sterling, 219 Md. 217, 222, 148 
A.2d 453, 456 (1959) (same court stating that "fire insurance ... is a contract of personal in-
demnity ... and the right to recover 'must be commensurate with the loss actually sustained' 
by the insured"); Pruitt v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 112 F.2d 140, 142 (5th Cir. 
1940) (holding that "if the event insured against is in progress when the insurance ter-
minates, the final loss caused thereby is recoverable"); Pfeiffer v. General Ins. Corp., 185 F. 
Supp. 605, 608-09 (N.D. Cal. 1960) (slow moving landslide affected safety of insured home 
and insurance company cancelled policy before any actual damage occurred; court declared 
that "the contingency having arisen the liability of the insurer became a contractual obliga-
tion and ... cancellation of the policy could not affect rights which had already accrued"). 
27 See Green v. Green, 50 S.C. 514, 27 S.E. 952 (1897). 
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life tenant, who has insured the premises for the whole fee value with 
his own funds for his sole benefit,' is entitled to the entire proceeds.28 
Since the remainderman also has an insurable interest in the property, 
he too could insure it and keep the proceeds for himselF unless a 
fiduciary relationship or contractual obligation requires him to insure 
for the benefit of the life tenant. 
Landlord and Tenant 
Certain lessor-lessee cases are analogous to life tenant situations. In 
one situation, the lessee improves the demised premises, and the lease 
provides that in case of damage during the term the lessor or lessee 
may restore the improvement. In another situation, the lease provides 
that the improvements shall revert to the lessor at the end of the term.30 
If the lessor and lessee have separately insured the improvements and 
the insurable event, such as a fire, occurs, what is the measure of 
recovery of the lessee or lessor against the insurer for damaged prop-
erty which the other has repaired? Two often cited cases31 reflect the ir-
reconcilable split of authority on this issue. In Ramsdell v. Insurance Co. 
of North America,32 the lessee remodeled the premises and the lessee 
and lessor separately insured their interests. After a fire damaged the 
structure, the lessee restored it, as he had a right to do under the lease, 
and his insurer reimbursed him. The lessor's insurer resisted the claim, 
and the court agreed, even though it found that the lessor had an in-
surable interest and that the damage is determined at the time of the 
fire rather than in the future when repairs have been made, saying: 
"The court looks to the substance of the whole transaction rather than 
to seek a metaphysical hypothesis upon which to justify a loss that is no 
loss."33 The court in Alexandra Restaurant, Inc. v. New Hampshire In-
surance Co. 34 arrives at the opposite result. In Alexandra, fire damaged 
the lessee's improvements and the lessor, in accordance with his obliga-
tion under the lease, repaired the damage. The lessee's insurer refused 
. . 
"' See In re Gorman's Estate, 321 Pa. 292, 184 A. 86 (1936). For a collection of cases in 
other states which have confronted this issue, see id. at 295-96, 184 A. at 87-88. 
20 See, e.g., Harrison v. Pepper, 166 Mass. 288, 44 N.E. 222 (1896); Farmers' Mut. Fire & 
Lightning Ins. Co. v. Crowley, 354 Mo. 649, 190 S.W.2d 250 (1945). 
30 The illustration here does not involve a "straight" lease, such as where the tenant 
simply rents the lessor's premises and insures his leasehold. In such cases, the tenant 
recovers only the difference between the market value of his lease and the actual rents he 
pays. Such recovery fully conforms to the principles of indemnity. 
31 See Alexandra Restaurant, Inc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 272 A.D. 346, 71 N.Y.S.2d 
515 (1947); Ramsdell v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 197 Wis. 136, 221 N.W. 654 (1928). 
32 197 Wis. 136, 221 N.W. 654 (1928). 
33 /d. at 139, 221 N.W. at 655. 
"' 272 A.D. 346, 71 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1947). 
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the claim of the lessee,35 arguing that the lessee had not sustained any 
loss. The court; ruled in favor of the· lessee stating: 
"The fact that improvements on land may have cost the owner 
nothing, or that if destroyed by fire he may compel another person to 
replace them without expense to him, or that he may recoup his loss 
by resort to a contract liability of a third person, in no way affects the 
liability of an insurer, in the absence of any exemption in the policy."36 
The foregoing cases illustrate the landlord-tenant situations where 
one or the other repairs the damage and the claimant-insured has no ac-
tual loss. Federowicz v. Potomac Insurance Co. 37 illustrates the other 
situation, where upon the expiration of the lease the improvements 
made by the tenant revert to the landlord. The insuring clause at issue 
in Federowicz provided that th.e insured could recover "to the extent of 
the actual cash value of the property at the time of loss but not ... 'in 
any event for more than the interest of the insured.' "38 The landlord had 
the right to terminate the lease on thirty days' notice, in which event 
35 The lessor's insurer paid the lessor on his separate policy. Id. at 347-48, 71 N.Y.S.2d at 
517. 
34 Id. at 349, 71 N.Y.S.2d at 519 (quoting Foley v. Mfrs.' & Builders' Fire Ins. Co., 152 
N.Y. 131, 135, 46 N.E. 318, 319 (1897)). It is possible that the court was influenced by one 
commentator's definition of indemnity which it quoted: "'[Indemnity means] that the party 
insured is entitled to be compensated for such loss as is occasioned by the perils insured 
against, in precise r.ccordance with the principles and terms of the contract of insurance."' 
272 A.D. at 351, 71 N.Y.S.2d at 521 (quoting 1 J. JOYCE. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IN-
SURANCE§ 24, at 123 (2d ed. 1917)). The court quoted Joyce further: '"Nor are his damages 
to be diminished because he has collateral contracts or relations with third persons which 
relieve him wholly or partly from the loss against which the insurance company agreed to 
indemnify him.'" 272 A.D. at 351, 71 N.Y.S.2d at 521 (quoting 1 J. JOYCE, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF INSURANCE§ 24a, at 125 (2d ed. 1917)). 
It is interesting to note that the Alexandra court came to this conclusion notwithstand-
ing a prior, contrary decision on identical facts. See Larner v. Commercial Union Assurance 
Co., 127 Misc. 1, 215 N.Y.S. 151 (1926). Larner was probably an aberration, since New York 
had already ruled in Foley v. Mfrs.' & Builders' Fire Ins. Co., 152 N.Y. 31, 46 N.E. 318 
(1897), that when a house under construction was damaged and the contractor, under a 
turn-key contract, repaired the da1nage at no cost to the owner-insured, the insured could 
recover the full amount of damage since at the time of loss the building had not been 
repaired. The subsequent action of the contractor had no bearing on the liability of the in-
surer under the policy. Accord, American Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 125 Ga. App.189, 186 S.E.2d 
547 (1971) (vendee's insurer liable even though vendee was not required to pay anything un-
til house was completed). 
In Magulas v. Travelers Ins. Co., 114 N.H. 704,327 A.2d 608 (1974), it was held that since 
11/12 of the lease term was unexpired at the time of the loss, the tenant-insured could 
recovery only 11/12 of the loss to the improvements he made. For a similar result under a 
different setting, see City of Carlsbad v. Northwestern Nat'! Ins. Co., 81 N.M. 56,463 P.2d 
32 (1970). 
31 7 A.D.2d 330, 183 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1959). 
34 Id. at 331, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 117. This phrase was standard in New York fire policies 
after 1943. Act of April 20, 1943, ch. 671, § 1(6), 1943 N.Y. Laws 1337 [hereinafter cited as 
1943 N.Y. Standard Policy] (current version at N.Y. INS. LAw§ 168 (McKinney 1966)). 
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the insured had five days to remove the buildings he had placed on the 
land. Failure to do so would vest ownership of the buildings in the 
landlord. The defendant offered evidence to show that fire destroyed 
the buildings more than five days after the termination of the lease and 
that the buildings had not been removed by the insured. The- court con-
cluded: "Once it is found that the plaintiff had an insurable interest at 
the time of the fire he is entitled to recover the value of the building as 
it stood, without regard to the fact that he might shortly thereafter be 
required to remove it."39 
Even though a life tenant or lessee may recover the replacement 
value of the damaged property, although such value may exceed the 
property interest held therein, such a rule should not apply to a tenant 
at sufferance. No unanimity exists on this point, however. In Liverpool 
& London & Globe Insurance Co. v. Bolling,40 the insured possessed a 
mercantile store building with the oral permission of her ex-father-in-
law that "she could have it as long as she wanted it."41 While in her 
possession, the building burned. The court, with two justices dissenting, 
awarded her a full recovery, finding that she possessed an insurable in-
terest42 and characterizing her possession as a life tenancy.43 The 
Alabama court in Fidelity Phenix Fire Insurance Co. v. Raper,44 
however, did not agree with such a view. The court pointed out: "[T]he 
plaintiff [insured] had no right which he could enforce so far as the 
building was concerned and could have been ousted at any time .... [A] 
person with no interest in the land other than that of a tenant by suf-
ferance ... has no insurable interest in the property ."45 
•• 7 A.D.2d at 334, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 119. In his concurring opinion, Justice Williams 
strongly opposes this conclusion and advocates that the insured only recover, if he may 
recover anything at all, his financial loss resulting from the destruction of the structure. Id. 
at 339, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 124 (Williams, J., concurring). But cf. Girard Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 6 
A.D.2d 359, 177 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1958) (measure of loss was the actual cash value of property). 
" 176 Va. 182, 10 S.E.2d 518 (1940). 
u ld. at 190, 10 S.E.2d at 521. 
" "It was her livelihood ..•• [S]he was vitally interested [in the continued existence of 
the building]; her living hung upon it." ld. 
" "She had what was in substance a life estate ..•. She had no other means of support 
••.. Common sense tells us that she will hold on to what she has." Id. at 193, 10 S.E.2d at 
522-23. 
u 242 Ala. 440, 6 So. 2d 513 (1941). 
<5 ld. at 442, 6 So. 2d at 514. The unusual and confusing facts of the case, in simplified · -
form, were that the owner of the land leased it to B who, contrary to the terms of the lease, 
sublet without the owner's permission to F, who built a building thereon. The building then 
became the property of the owner since the lease had no provision for erecting im-
provements. F, in turn, sold the building to the plaintiff-insured and sublet the land, again 
without permission of the owner, to the plaintiff. The building burned and the insurer refused 
to pay on the grounds that the insured had no insurable interest in the building. The court 
agreed with the insurer. 
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MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN MISCELLANEOUS RELATIONSHIPS 
Husband and Wife 
An individual purchasing an insurance policy on his residence or farm 
usually does not seek the advice of an attorney; therefore, it is not 
unusual for a husband to insure property in his own name even though 
title is in his wife's.46 Most of the cases in this area are old and involve 
the issue of whether the husband has an insurable interest in the wife's 
property as necessarily precedent to the question of how much he may 
recover. The jurisdictions are divided on the insurable interest issue 
with the cases turning mainly on the married women's property 
statutes. In most cases where an insurable interest is found to exist, 
recovery is allowed for the full value of the property rather than merely 
for the husband's limited interest. In Merrett v. Farmers Insurance Co. 47 
and Kludt v. German Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,48 the courts grounded 
their decisions on beneficial ownership. Since, in each case, the 
homestead which was owned by the wife was used for the welfare of the 
whole family, the husband was held to have had the entire beneficial 
ownership and was, therefore, able to recover the full value, rather than 
merely the value of his interest as a tenant by curtesy. In Trade In-
surance Co. v. Barraclif/,49 the court found that the husband was an im-
plied agent of the wife who was an implied undisclosed principal and 
that, as such an agent, he could sue in his own name for the full value. 
Absent intentional misrepresentation by the spouse in insuring in his 
own name the property of the other spouse, the courts generally find for 
the insured on either one of these theories. This is not always the case, 
however. In Bassett v. Farmers' & Merchants' Insurance Co.,50 the court 
denied recovery. Relying on the Nebraska rule which allowed a married 
woman to dispose of her real estate without her husband's assent and 
by her sole deed to convey clear title, free even of his inchoate rights, 
the court found that the husband in whose name her property (a farm 
which was not their homestead) was insured did not have an insurable 
interest and, therefore, did not allow him to recover at all.51 Doyle v. 
•• This was the case in earlier days more often than it is now. Today, most dwellings and 
farms are mortgaged, and the lender ensures that the insurance is issued in the proper 
name. 
" 42 Iowa 11 (1875). 
•• 152 Wis. 637, 140 N.W. 321 (1913). 
•• 45 N.J.L. 543 (1883). 
"' 85 Neb. 85, 122 N.W. 703 (1909). 
51 Although the court indicated that if the evidence had shown that there was an agree-
ment between the husband and wife that he could have the use of the land during his 
lifetime, then an insurable interest could have been found, it stated: "There is not a scintilla 
of evidence to indicate that the fire was of incendiary origin, and we dislike very much to 
reverse the judgment before us, but the failure of proof referred to is clear and our duty 
imperative." Id. at 88·89, 122 N.W. at 704. 
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American Fire Insurance Co. 52 merely limited the insured's recovery. 
The court noted that under Massachusetts law a husband has a tenancy 
by the curtesy initiate in the property of his wife and cannot be deprived 
of it without his consent. He has an insurable interest in her property, 
but the amount he can recover where such property is insured in his 
sole name is limited to the value of his inchoate right as a tenant by 
curtesy. The court strictly observed the principles of indemnity. 
Bailor and Bailee 
Cases involving insurance policies covering property held by bailees 
turn on the question of whether the bailee can recover not only the 
value of his interest but also the interest of the bailor. These issues 
necessitate an analysis of the specific wording of the coverage clause in 
the insurance contract.53 Where the bailee can recover the bailor's in-
terest, he holds such recovery in trust for the bailor. In bailor-bailee 
cases the principle of indemnity is observed and no extensive discussion 
of the subject is necessary. 
Mortgagor and Mortgagee 
The mortgagor-mortgagee cases similarly adhere to the indemnifica-
tion principles. Where the mortgagor only insures his own interest, he 
can recover the full value thereof within the limits of the policy.54 Since 
he continues to be liable on the debt, he recovers his net "equity." 
Where the mortgagor insures for the benefit of the mortgagee and 
himself,S5 the proceeds of the policy-the lesser of the debt or damage.-
are paid to the mortgagee.56 Since the de.bt is then reduced by such pay-:__ 
52 181 Mass. 139, 63 N.E. 394 (1902). 
53 Certain phrases in the coverage clauses have been given highly technical interpreta-
tions. For examples of such phrases, see United States v. Globe & Rutgers, Ins. Co., 104 F. 
Supp. 632, 633 (N.D. Tex. 1952), aff'd, 202 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1953) ("'[property], their own, 
and provided the insured is legally liable therefor, this policy shall also cover [property of 
others]'"); Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Murdoch Cotton Co.,193 Ark. 327,328,99 S.W.2d 233,234 
(1936) ('"[property], their own or held in trust •.. or for which assured may be liable"'); 
Aaro Packaging Corp. v. Fire Ins. Exch., 280 Minn. 159, 160, 158 N.W.2d 586, 587 (1968) 
("'personal property .•. held in trust"'); B.N. Exton & Co. v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
249 N.Y. 258, 260, 164 N.E. 43, 44 (1928) ('"property of the assured held in trust or on com-
mission'"); Brooklyn Clothing Corp. v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 205 A.D. 743, 747, 200 
N.Y.S. 208, 211 (1923) ('"legal liability for ... property held by them ... in trust'"); McCoy 
v. Home Ins. Co., 170 Pa. Super. Ct. 38, 41,84 A.2d 249,251 ("'property held by the insured 
... in trust, .•. or otherwise held"'). 
54 See Bryan v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 213 N.C. 391, 196 S.E. 345 (1938). 
53 This is the usual situation and is most frequently accomplished through the inclusion 
of a standard mortgagee clause in the policy • 
.. See Savarese v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 260 N.Y. 45, 182 N.E. 665 (1932). This is true 
even if the property has been repaired and the mortgagee's security has been fully 
restored. Id. at 54, 182 N.E. at 667; cf. Ben-Morris Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 3 Mass. App. Ct. 
779, 333 N.E.2d 455 (1975) (proceeds of foreclosure were properly applied in reduction of in-
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ment,57 the mortgagee does not receive a double recovery. Where the 
mortgagee insures for his sole benefit, the proceeds of insurance do not 
inure to the benefit of the mortgagor,S8 and the debt is not reduced. 
Through subrogation,59 the insurer will collect that portion of the debt 
from the mortgagor and prevent the mortgagee's double recovery.60 
Vendor and Vendee 
Entering into a binding executory contract for a sale of real property 
does not deprive the seller of his insurable interest, and, conversely, the 
purchaser acquires an insurable interest in such property.61 Thus, both 
vendor and vendee have a concurrent insurable interest in the same 
subject at the same time. Usually, the seller carries insurance, and the 
purchaser does not obtain insurance at the time of entering into the ex-
ecutory contract. The executory contract rarely contains an insurance 
provision, leaving the question of liability and recovery in event of 
damage for judicial determination.62 These circumstances produce a uni-
que situation. The vendor, who merely has a naked legal title for security, 
has insurance on the property to its full value, unless he is underin-
sured, and he also has the right to specific performance if the property 
has been destroyed or damaged.63 On the other hand, the buyer, who has 
the full equitable title, and who generally does not possess the property 
during the period prior to conveyance,64 has no insurance even though 
he would bear the loss.65 
The natural question arises as to whether the proceeds of the 
vendor's insurance are to be credited toward the purchase price, making 
the uninsured vendee the beneficiary of the vendor's policy, or whether 
the vendor may retain the money, giving him a windfall.66 The New 
surer's liability to the mortgagee). See also Grady v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 94 Misc. 2d 558, 
404 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1978). 
57 See Walter v. Marine Office of America, 537 F.2d 89, 99 (5th Cir. 1976) (mortgagee 
holds excess for mortgagor); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bleedorn, 235 Mo. App. 286, 132 
S.W.2d 1066 (1939); Waring v. Loder, 53 N.Y. 581 (1873). 
58 See LeDoux v. Dettmering, 316 Ill. App. 98, 109, 43 N.E.2d 862, 867 (1942). 
•• For a thorough discussion of the concept of subrogation, see R. KEETON. supra note 4, 
at 147-68. 
"' See LeDoux v. Dettmering, 316 Ill. App. 98, 111, 43 N.E.2d 862, 868 (1942). 
61 The purchaser acquires this interest either under the doctrine of equitable conversion 
or under a broad definition of an insurable interest. For one definition of insurable interest, 
see note 3 supra. 
62 Of course, if there is a stipulation covering such an event in the contract, it will be 
given effect. 
63 This is only true absent contractual or statutory modification of such a right . 
.. Because the buyer does not possess the property during this time, he is generally 
unable to protect it. 
65 This liability may, of course, be modified by contract or statute . 
.. Although insurers have attempted to resist any payment on the ground that the in-
surable interest of the vendor has terminated or that the policy terms require an endorse-
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York court in Brownell v. Board of Education,61 relying on the old 
English rule of Rayner v. Preston,66 answered the question in favor of 
the vendor. Brownell stated: "Insurance is a mere personal contract ... 
to protect the interest of the insured."69 Responding to the argument 
that the money should be credited toward the purchase price since in 
equity the vendee is the beneficial owner of the land, the court replied: 
"These reasons may savor of layman's ideas of equity, but they are not 
law."70 Most states, however, hold that the insurance proceeds are to be 
credited toward the purchase price. Although there are earlier cases, 
Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America11 is a frequently 
cited case supporting this viewJhe court in Dubin stated: 
The problem before us is clarified if the fact is noted that as be-
tween the insured and the insurance companies the insured remains 
the owner of the property until the sale is completed, but as between 
the vendor and vendee the vendor holds only the legal title and if he 
receives the proceeds of the insurance policy on his property he holds 
these as trustee for the buyer. The vendee's interest was not insured 
by the defendants; the vendor's was. The vendee's right to a part of 
the policy's proceeds in the vendee's [sic] hands is derived from the 
agreement of sale when that is given the meaning which under the 
circumstances of this case the "conscience of equity" says it must be 
given.72 
It is possible to argue that Brownell can be reconciled with the majority 
view. According to the terms of the contract in Brownell, the vendor 
was to bear the loss in the event of a casualty to the structure and the 
vendee was limited to recovery of a sum equal to the amount of his 
downpayment.73 This argument is inconsistent with the statement in the 
ment any time a change in the interest of the insured occurs, it has been consistently held 
that the insurer is liable to the vendor, except where a forfeiture provision of the policy has 
been found effective. For an informative discussion of cases construing these provisions, 
see Goble, The Moral Hazard Clauses of the Standard Fire Insurance Policy, 37 COLUM. L. 
REv. 410 (1937). Such provisions no longer exist since the wording of the standard New 
York fire policy was introduced in 1943. See 1943 N.Y. Standard Policy, supra note 38, § 1, 
pt. 6. For a review of the history and effect of the pertinent forfeiture phrases and their 
elimination from the 1943 Standard New York Fire Policy, see Federowicz v. Potomac Ins. 
Co., 7 A.D.2d 330, 183 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1959); 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (1942) . 
.., 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925) . 
.. 18 Ch. Div. 1 (1881). Dissatisfaction with this rule brought about the enactment of the 
Law of Property Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 16, § 105, which applies the vendor's in-
surance proceeds toward the purchase price. 
•• 239 N.Y. at 374, 146 N.E. at 632 (citing Rayner v. Preston, 18 Ch. Div. 1 (1881)). 
70 239 N.Y. at 374, 146 N.E. at 632. 
71 361 Pa. 68, 63 A.2d 85 (1949). 
72 /d. at 85-86, 63 A.2d at 94 (emphasis added). The Dubin case relied on the constructive 
trust doctrine to support the duty of the vendor to hold the insurance proceeds for the 
vendee. Id. at 87-92, 63 A.2d at 95-97. One court noted a commentator's suggestion "that in 
the business world insurance runs with the land, and that the courts should give effect to 
that understanding." Brownell v. Board of Educ., 235 N.Y. 369, 373, 146 N.E. 630, 632 (1925) 
(citing Vance, Vendee's Claim to Insurance Money Received By Vendor, 34 YALE L.J. 87 
(1924)). The Brownell court did not follow that suggestion. 
73 235 N.Y. at 374-75, 146 N.E. at 632. See also R. KEETON, supra note 4, at 202-05. 
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later New York case of Raplee v. Piper.74 In Raplee, the court cited 
Brownell and said: "If ... the vendor at his own cost, for his own protec-
tion and not because of any agreement, has taken out fire insurance, 
then such contract is personal to him and he need not credit the pro-
ceeds against the price."75 As indicated above, nearly all other jurisdic-
tions, with the possible exception of Louisiana76 and Wisconsin,77 follow 
the equitable rule that insurance proceeds are to be applied toward the 
purchase price.78 
Although the principle of indemnity is generally observed in vendor 
insured cases, when the vendee is insured, courts deviate from that 
principle.79 For example, in Cooke v. Fireman's Insurance Co.,80 the 
vendee, who had insured for his exclusive benefit, was not limited to the 
value of his actual investment at the time of the fire but recovered the 
full amount of the loss within the policy limits. The vendee-insured had 
expended $1,750 toward the purchase and repair of the premises. The 
loss due to the fire was $7,938. Although title impediments existed at 
the time of the fire, their presence did not preclude the insured from ac-
quiring title. The court permitted the insured to recover the full $7,938, 
plus interest, citing, inter alia, Federowicz v. Potomac Insurance Co. 81 
There has been a divergence of decisions involving damage to or 
destruction of personal property subject to a contract .of sale or held as 
security interests.82 Some have followed the equitable rule,83 while 
" 3 N.Y.2d 179, 143 N.E.2d 919 (1957). 
75 Id. at 181, 143 N.E.2d at 920. 
70 See King v. Preston, 11 La. Ann. 95 (1856). 
77 See Smith v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 253 Wis.129, 33 N.W.2d 206 (1948). 
78 A federal court interpreting Pennsylvania law reached a decision which could be 
described as an "overkill." In Vogel v. Northern Assurance Co., 219 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1955), 
the vendor and vendee agreed on a $15,000 price. The vendor obtained insurance in the 
amount of $6,000 and the vendee obtained insurance in the amount of $9,000. Before con-
veyance, the house sustained damage amounting to $12,000. The vendee, having thereafter 
paid the purchase price, received an assignment from the vendor of the vendor's rights in 
his fire policy. The court, finding an insurable interest in both the vendor and vendee, held 
that the vendee could collect from the two insurers the full $15,000 since the vendee bore 
the risk of loss at the time of the fire and the .seller held his interest in trust for the pur-
chaser. One year later, however, the Pennsyvlania Supreme Court in Insurance Co. of N. 
America v. Alberstadt, 383 Pa. 556, 119 A.2d 83 (1956), apportioned the amount of the loss 
between the insurance companies, where the vendor and vendee had separate policies, the 
sum of which, as in Vogel, exceeded the loss, and by such apportionment avoided the result 
in Vogel. 
79 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cagle, 249 F.2d 241 (lOth Cir. 1957); Martinson v. 
Morton Farmers Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 217 Iowa 335, 251 N.W. 503 (1933); Deming Inv. Co. v. 
Dickerman, 63 Kan. 728, 66 P. 1029 (1901); Milhous v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 161 
S.C. 96, 159 S.E. 506 (1931). 
"" 119 N.J. Super. 248, 291 A.2d 24 (1972). 
81 7 A.D.2d 330, 183 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1959); see text accompanying notes 37-39 supra. 
82 See In re Future Mfg. Coop., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 111, 115-16 (N.D. Cal. 1958) (court noted 
that jurisdictions were split on this issue). 
83 See, e.g., Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America v. Robinson-Slagle Lumber Co., 147 
So. 542 (La. App. 1933). 
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others have followed the personal contract theory.84 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN PARTICULAR SITUATIONS 
Demolition and Condemnation Cases 
In demolition cases, the scenario is usually as follows: the owner of an 
insured building enters into a contract to have the structure demolished, 
and, mirabile dictu, the premises burn before demolition begins. In con-
demnation cases, a fire destroys the insured property after condemna-
tion proceedings have begun, but before the condemnor accepts title or 
a condemnation award. In these situations, the insurer usually raises as 
a defense the lack of an insurable interest and the complementary argu-
ment of de minimis value.85 A mere executory contract to demolish, 
without any additional legally binding agreement enforceable by 
specific performance does not deprive the owner of his insurable in-
terest in the property.88 Similarly, the owner of property which is the 
subject of condemnation proceedings retains his insurable interest until 
condemnation has been completed.87 Thus, the issue of whether an in-
surable interest exists requires no further discussion. The defense of de 
minimis value is merely a portion of the larger issue of the meaning of 
the term "actual cash value" -a standard limitation of the insurer's 
liability contained in fire insurance policies.88 
14 See, e.g., Interstate Ice & Power Corp. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 243 N.Y. 95,152 
N.E. 476 (1926) (vendee defaulted on purchase agreement; vendor awarded insurance pro-
ceeds when machinery was damaged by fire). 
85 There may be other specific defenses, such as violations of the policy provision against 
an increase in the hazard. A discussion of these defenses, however, is beyond the scope of 
this article . 
.. See, e.g., American Ins. Co. v. Treasurer, School Dist. No. 37, 273 F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 
1959); Paterson·Leitch Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 366 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ohio 
1973); St. Paul's Roman Catholic Church v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 65 Misc. 2d 975, 319 
N.Y.S.2d 239 (1971); Leggio v. Millers Nat'! Ins. Co., 398 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); 
Eagle Square Mfg. Co. v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 125 Vt. 221, 212 A.2d 636 (1965); cf. 
Royal Ins. Co. v. Sisters of the Presentation, 430 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1970) (insurable interest 
terminated even though the demolition contract was not specifically enforceable). 
87 See, e.g., American Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 38 Ill. App. 2d 315, 187 
N.E.2d 343 (1962); Patrick v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 413 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 
1967); Rosenbloom v. Maryland Ins. Co., 258 A.D. 14, 15 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1939); Heidisch v. 
Globe & Republic Ins. Co., 368 Pa. 602, 84 A.2d 566 (1951); Home Ins. Co. v. Dalis, 206 Va. 
71, 141 S.E.2d 721 (1965); cf. Van Cure v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 435 Pa. 163, 253 A.2d 663 
(1969) (condemnee, after bond has been filed, has no insurable interest when he remains on 
condemned property with consent of condemnor for purpose of reducing damages) . 
.. The language of limitation in the New York Standard Fire Policy reads as follows: 
"[T]his Company ..• does insure [the insured] ... to the extent of the actual cash value of 
the property at the time of loss, but not exceeding the amount which it cost to repair or 
replace the property ... , nor in any event for more than the interest of the insured .... " 
1943 N.Y. Standard Policy, supra note 38, § 1, pt. 6. For a discussion of problems involving 
valuation, see text accompanying notes 97-133 infra. 
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Whether, under principles of indemnity, an owner who has committed 
his structure to demolition should recover any amount when the struc-
ture burns prior to demolition, and whether an owner whose structure 
has been condemned should recover when the structure burns before 
the completion of the statutory condemnation proceedings and the con-
demnor pays the condemnee in any event, are issues which bear discus-
sion. In Garey Corp. v. Home Insurance Co.,89 the owner of five buildings 
contracted to have them demolished. Demolition was in progress on 
several buildings, but not on a seven story one; it was still used as a 
warehouse and had not been stripped of salvageable materials. The court 
permitted recovery when the building burned before demolition. Even 
though it might have subjected him to liability for breach of the demoli-
tion contract, the owner could have halted the demolition before the 
wrecking crew reached it. Therefore, the building was not actually in 
the process of demolition when fire destroyed it and the insurer was 
liable for the actual cash value of the building to the insured owner. The 
court reasoned that until the building is abandoned to an irrevocable 
commitment to demolish it, the owner is entitled to recover the actual 
cash value in case of damage or destruction by a casualty covered by the 
policy. This is the prevailing view.90 Where, however, the commitment 
to demolish is irrevocable, the insured loses his insurable interest and 
cannot recover.91 
.. 496 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1974). 
00 See, e.g., Bailey v. Gulf Ins. Co., 406 F.2d 47 (lOth Cir. 1969); American Ins. Co. v. 
Treasurer, School Dist. No. 37, 273 F.2d 757 (lOth Cir. 1959); Knuppel v. American Ins. Co., 
269 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1959); Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 366 F. 
Supp. 749 (N.D. Ohio 1973); St. Paul's Roman Catholic Church v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 
65 Misc. 2d 975, 319 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1971); Leggio v. Millers Nat'! Ins. Co., 398 S.W.2d 607 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Eagle Square Mfg. Co. v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,l25 Vt. 221,212 
A.2d 636 (1965); cf. Royal Ins. Co. v. Sisters of the Presentation, 430 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1970) 
(insurable interest terminated even though the demolition contract was not specifically en-
forceable). 
In Leg!Po v. Millers Nat'! Ins. Co., 398 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), and Eagle 
Square Mfg. Co. v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 125 Vt. 221, 212 A.2d 636 (1965), it was held 
that the process of demolition had not begun despite the removal of flooring, plumbing, 
light fixtures, windows, wood paneling and doors from the buildings. 
•• Royal Ins. Co. v. Sisters of the Presentation, 430 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.1970); Lieberman v. 
Hartford Ins. Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 948, 287 N.E.2d 38 (1972); Board of Educ. v. Hartford Ins. 
Co., 124 W.Va. 163, 19 S.E.2d 448 (1942). 
In Lieberman v. Hartford Ins. Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 948,287 N.E.2d 38 (1972), the demolition 
was in its early stages when fire destroyed the building. The court emphasized the binding 
nature of the demolition contract without explaining how it was binding and stated that 
"[t]he destruction of the building was not 'economically disadvantageous' to plaintiff." 6 Dl. 
App. 3d at 950, 287 N.E.2d at 40. The plaintiff consequently had no insurable interest at the 
time of the fire. 
Royal Ins. Co. v. Sisters of the Presentation, 430 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1970), involved a con-
vent. The Sisters had already moved to a new convent and abandoned the old one, under a 
binding agreement with the bishop to surrender the old building for demolition in exchange 
for the new convent built on land deeded to them by the bishop. Since all the bishop's con· 
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Whether an insured can recover for loss to property which has been 
condemned turns on the question whether the condemnation proceedings 
have been completed. The statutory scheme regulating condemnations 
is determinative. In Patrick v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual In-
surance Co.,92 the condemnor paid the condemnee and, under the 
statute, could have evicted him at the time of payment. However, the 
condemnor permitted the condemnee to remain. Fifteen days after the 
payment, fire destroyed the insured property. In her suit against the in-
surer, the condemnee argued that she had an insurable interest in the 
property at the time of loss since the condemnor had the right to wholly 
abandon the condemnation proceedings after the fire. The court, in 
analyzing the pertinent Kentucky statutes, determined that the con-
demnor could not abandon the proceedings after it paid the award. 
Although the condemnee could appeal the amount awarded, the insured 
had no insurable interest at the time of loss. Under the statute the con-
demnation proceedings terminated at the time of payment of the award. 
In Home Insurance Co. v. Dalis,93 the Virginia court interpreted the per-
tractual obligations had been performed, the Sisters were legally bound to permit the raz-
ing of the old building and, therefore, had no insurable interest therein at the time of the 
fire. 
Board of Educ. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 124 W.Va. 163, 19 S.E.2d 448 (1942) presented an in-
teresting "twist." A new school building was needed because the old one had become unin-
surable. Financial assistance was granted by the Public Works Administration (PWA). One 
requirement for such advances was that the contractor must be in the process of work. To 
obtain the first advance, the Board, on December 29, ordered the contractor to proceed, and 
notified the PW A that demolition of the old school building had begun. The contractor 
merely staked out the location of the new school, embracing that of the old. On January 16, 
the contractor was notified that the old building would be vacated on January 23. On 
January 20, fire completely destroyed the building. At the time of fire no acts of demolition 
had begun. The court found that since the PW A had been notified that demolition had 
started on January 1, the Board was bound by that conduct and that abandonment of the 
building had taken place before the fire. The court concluded: "[T]here is sufficient proof, 
together with the reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom, to sustain the finding that 
the board of education prior to January 20, 1938 had permanently stopped using the New 
Cumberland School building for its intended purpose, and had begun the physical work of 
its removal." 124 W.Va. at 169, 19 S.E.2d at 451 (emphasis added). 
The prevailing view that, once demolition has begun, the insured may not recover where 
the structure is destroyed by fire or other insured casualty prior to completion of the 
demolition, is well expressed by Aetna State Bank v. Maryland Cas. Co., 345 F. Supp. 903, 
909 (N.D. Ill. 1972): 
We therefore find that actual cash value is not the proper criteria [sic] for 
determining the amount of loss for property which is in the process of being 
demolished and whose demolition at the time of loss is no longer a matter of 
conjecture or speculation and we hold that ... there is nevertheless no ... 
compensable Joss in view of the fact that there is no value to buildings in the 
process of demolition. 
" 413 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1967) (construing S.B. 138, ch. 49, §§ 6(2)(C), 7(6); 1952 Ky. Acts 86; 
S.B. 299, ch. 219, § 1, 1962 Ky. Acts 762 (repealed 1976)) . 
.. 206 Va. 71, 141 S.E.2d 721 (1965) (Act of March 29, 1958, ch. 581, § 1, 1958 Va. Acts 875 
(repealed 1970)). 
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tinent Virginia statute to reach a different outcome. The State Highway 
Department condemned the property of the insured and filed a cer-
tificate of recordation which, under the Virginia statute, vested title in 
the condemnor, even though no agreement had been reached as to com-
pensation and there had not been condemnation proceedings instituted. 
Fire destroyed the two structures, but the insurance company, relying 
on the statute, denied liability. The court noted that the statute provided 
for defeasible title until the Commissioner of the highway department 
and condemnee could agree on a price or until such price was determined 
by condemnation proceedings. Since such agreement was not reached 
prior to the fire, the insured recovered his loss. In American National 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Reserve Insurance Co.,94 an Illinois court reached a 
similar result. Although condemnation proceedings were pending, the 
condemnor could, under the statute, abandon its petition altogether. 
Thus the insured owner whose property had been condemned had an in-
surable interest at the time of the fire and recovered his loss. 
A most benevolent decision was rendered in Wolf v. Home Insurance 
Co. 95 Before a fire, the insured owner agreed, in lieu of condemnation 
proceedings, to sell the property to the potential condemnor who then 
took possession. The sale was not finalized until five months after the 
fire, the insured receiving the full original price agreed upon. The court, 
however, rejected the insurer's defense of equitable ownership in 
another.96 The court agreed with the prevailing view: until the condem-
nation is completed, the owner may recover for the physicalJoss to the 
property, regardless of the absence of financial loss. 
PROBLEMS IN VALUATION 
Three methods for the valuation of real property97 have evolved 
under judicial interpretation of the phrase "actual cash value," a 
limiting phrase which was included in the insuring clause of the 1943 
statutorily formulated New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy98 
which has been adopted by a vast majority of state legislatures or ad-
ministrative regulators.99 The three approaches are: first, market value 
04 38 Ill. App. 2d 315, 187 N.E.2d 343 (1962). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47,1 10(a) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1980). 
•• 100 N.J. Super. 27, 241 A.2d 28 (1968) . 
.. Id. at 50, 241 A.2d at 41 (citing Heidisch v. Globe & Republic Ins. Co., 368 Pa. 602, 84 
A.2d 566 (1951)). 
01 Attention here is focused on real property only. For an extensive discussion on valua-
tion of personal property, see Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 711 (1958) . 
.. 1943 N.Y. Standard Policy, supra note 38, § 1, pt. 6. For a fuller quotation of the 
limiting language in the New York Standard Policy, see note 88 supra . 
.. SeeR. KEETON, supra note 4~'at 70. Some statutes use the synonymous phrase "actual 
value." See id. at 143. 
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or fair market value; second, replacement cost less depreciation; and 
third, the broad evidence rule. 
To establish a market value, there must be a means to arrive at an ob-
jective appraisal of the object sought to be valued. "It has been said 
that value does not inhere in the thing to be valued; that it is a subject-
ive conception; that identity of belief, on the part of many traders, as in-
dicated in a market, causes the conception to assume the objective qual-
ity of an established fact." 100 To establish a market price, many traders 
and many transactions are required. A single sale does not establish a 
market value. Land and the improvements thereon are considered 
unique; therefore, a "market" for a particular building cannot be estab-
lished.101 Nevertheless, some courts have adopted the market value 
criterion for both real and personal property .102 The California court in 
Jefferson Insurance Co. v. Superior Court103 may have given this valua-
tion concept a boost when it interpreted a California statute104 equating 
actual cash value and market value.105 Aetna State Bank v. Maryland 
Casualty Co. 106 illustrates the pragmatic difference between the choice 
of "market value" or "replacement cost less depreciation" as a method 
for valuation. The replacement less depreciation value of the structure 
was $300,000; its market value was zero. Although Illinois had con-
100 McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 182, 159 N.E. 902, 904 (1928). 
101 
Clearly, where no sales have been made, the opinion of an expert that the 
property in question "will sell" for a given sum does not establish "market 
value," in the sense of an exclusive criterion of value. "There cannot be an 
established market value for barges, boats, and other articles of that descrip-
tion, as in cases of grain, cotton, or stock." 
Id. at 182-83, 159 N.E. at 904 (quoting The Granite State, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 310, 314 (1865)). 
102 See, e.g., Forer v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 295 A.2d 247 (Me. 1972); Grantham v. 
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Neb. 790, 119 N.W.2d 519 (1963); Bartindale v. Aetna Ins. Co., 7 
N.J. Misc. 399, 145 A. 633 (1929); McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 159 
N.E. 902 (1928); Butler v. Aetna Ins. Co., 64 N.D. 764, 256 N.W. 214 (1934); cf. Agoos 
Leather Cos. v. American & Foreign Ins. Co., 342 Mass. 603, 174 N.E.2d 652 (1961) (market 
value of real property in itself not an accurate measure of indemnity for loss by fire). 
103 3 Cal. 3d 398, 475 P.2d 880, 90 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1970). 
1 
.. Act of Aprill4, 1950, ch. 5, § 1, 1950 Cal. Stats. 1st Extr. Sess. 432 (current version at 
CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (West 1972)). 
105 The court did not consider the broad evidence rule, and rejected the replacement cost 
less depreciation method outright: 
The latter clause insures "to the extent of the actual cash value of the prop-
erty at the time of loss, but not exceeding the ... cost to repair or replace the 
property ..•. " Since replacement cost less depreciation can never exceed 
replacement cost, it would not be logical to interpret this clause to mean "to 
the extent of the replacement cost less depreciation, but not exceeding the •.. 
cost to repair or replace the property." ..• If "actual cash value" had been in-
tended to mean replacement cost less depreciation, the Legislature would not 
have used "the cost to •.. replace the property" as a limiting factor, and would 
have specified as a limiting factor only the cost to repair the property. 
3 Cal. 3d at 402, 475 P.2d at 882-83, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 610-11. 
100 345 F. Supp. 903 (N.D. Ill. 1972). 
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sistently followed the replacement cost rule since 1920,1°7 the courts in 
Aetna, as well as in Lieberman v. Hartford Insurance Co./08 would not 
permit a windfall to the insured. The courts carved out an exception to 
the rule and, in effect, applied the market value method. As was stated 
in Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee 
Co.:'o9 
It appears from the Lieberman case that the Smith rule is limited 
by the policy of the law that requires an insurable interest as a condi-
tion to recovery on a contract of insurance. If, at the time of the fire, 
the building no longer has any economic value, there can be no in-
surable interest and therefore no recovery of damages.110 
One restrictive phrase in the standard fire policy limits the insurer's 
liability for loss to ~ctual cash value "not exceeding the amount which it 
would cost to repair or replace the property."111 A majority of the 
courts, relying on the word "replace," concluded that actual cash value 
should be determined by replacement cost less depreciation.112 One court 
expressed this view: 
While some of these authorities do say that the cost of replacement 
is not the measure of the loss but a limitation upon the recovery, all 
of them recognize that replacement cost, with physical depreciation 
for age, wear, and tear, is not only evidence of the amount of the loss, 
but is perhaps the most potent factor, among all the others in ascer-
taining the amount.113 
An advantage of the replacement rule is the certainty of measure-
ment.114 Dissatisfaction with the replacement method's inflexibility,115 
107 See Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 511 F.2d 241, 
244-45 (7th Cir. 1975). The source of the rule was Smith v. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co., 219 Ill. 
App. 506 (1920). 
'
08 6 III. App. 3d 948, 287 N.E.2d 38 (1972). 
109 511 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1975). 
110 Id. at 246. In Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 398, 475 P.2d 880, 90 Cal. 
Rptr. 608 (1970), the difference between the values determined under the two methods was 
not quite as large as in Aetna, yet it was very substantial-$170,000 for replacement cost 
less depreciation and $65,000 for market value. Such large differences are not unusual 
under the two methods. 
111 1943 N.Y. Standard Policy, supra note 38, § 1, pt. 6 (emphasis added). For other 
restrictive phrases in the standard policy, see note 88 supra. 
112 See, e.g., Knuppel v. American Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1959) (applying Illinois 
law); Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 366 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ohio 1973); 
Wisconsin Screw Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 193 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Sperling 
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 258 So. 2d 475 (F.la. App. 1972); Boise Ass'n of Credit Men v. 
United States Fire Ins. Co., 44 Idaho 249, 256 P. 523 (1927). But see Farber v. Perkiomen 
Mut. Ins. Co., 370 Pa. 480, 88 A.2d 776 (1952). 
113 Braddock v. Memphis Fire Ins. Co., 493 S.W.2d 453, 459 (Tenn. 1973) (quoting Third 
Nat'! Bank v. American Equitable Ins. Co., 27 Tenn. App. 249, 272, 178 S.W.2d 915, 924-25 
(1943)). 
"' Note, Valuation and Measure of Recovery Under Insurance Policies, 49 COLUM. L. 
REV. 818, 821 (1949). 
115 !d. 
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however, encouraged a trend toward use of the broad evidence rule in-
stead.118 
McAnarney v. Newark Fire Insurance Co. 117 is the leading case favor-
ing the use of the broad evidence rule. It does not reject the replace-
ment rule or the market rule, but includes them in a very broad panoply 
of factors to be considered in arriving at a determination of the actual 
cash value of the loss. 
[The trier of fact] may consider original cost and cost of reproduction; 
the opinions upon value given by qualified witnesses; the declarations 
against interest which may have been made by the assured; the gain-
ful uses to which the buildings might have been put; as well as any 
other fact reasonably tending to throw light upon the subject.118 
From the standpoint of the principle of indemnity, the broad evidence 
rule measures the loss better than the replacement rule, but it in-
troduces an element of uncertainty for the insured and the insurer. The 
trend to adopt this method of valuation has long been looked on in a 
favorable light.119 
[T]he courts, when faced with a choice between applying some stan-
dardized rigid rule such as replacement cost minus physical deprecia-
tion or of adopting some more flexible test which can be modified in 
such a way as to accord more nearly with the principle of indemnity, 
have generally preferred the latter alternative even though it has in-
volved the sacrifice of administrative convenience and of simplicity.120 
The element of depreciation is a factor under both the replacement 
rule and the broad evidence rule. A strong minority view holds that in 
case of partial losses where only repairs and not total replacement is re-
quired, depreciation should not be considered.121 "If depreciation were 
118 See note 118 infra; cf. Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 398, 475 P.2d 880, 
90 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1970) (in discarding the replacement rule the court could have adopted the 
broad evidence rule but instead opted for the fading market value criterion). 
117 247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 902 (1928). 
118 !d. at 184, 159 N.E. at 905. As of 1971, 23 states had adopted some form of the broad 
evidence rule. Schalliol, The Broad Evidence Rule and Fire Insurance and Tort Recoveries 
for Household Goods, 1973 INs. L.J. 365, 369. Cases which specifically express the con-
sideration of the market value factor and replacement cost less depreciation factor within 
the broad evidence rule include Eagle Square Mfg. Co. v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 125 
Vt. 221, 223, 212 A.2d 636, 638 (1965) ("Both market value and replacement cost are per-
missible standards for determining loss by fire- 'but they are standards, not shackles.'"), 
and Messing v. Reliance Ins. Co., 77 N.J. Super. 531, 534, 187 A.2d 49, 51 (1962) ("In apply-
ing this rule it is not necessary to abandon consideration of either market or reproduction 
values, but they must be viewed merely as guides and not the sole determinative in arriv-
ing at 'actual cash value.'"). 
119 See note 118 supra. 
120 Bonbright & Katz, Valuation of Property to Measure Fire Insurance Losses, 29 
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 899 (1929). 
121 See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Ryals, 355 So. 2d 684 (Ala. 1978); Glens Falls 
Ins. Co. v. Gulf Breeze Cottages, Inc., 38 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1949); Travelers Indem. Co. v. 
Armstrong, __ Ind. App. __ , 384 N.E.2d 607 (1979). Cases discussing this issue deal 
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allowed, it would cast upon the owner an added expense which we do 
not believe was contemplated by the parties when they entered into the 
insurance contract."122 
The McAnarney broad evidence rule123 was created before the present 
standard fire policy incorporated the phrase "nor in any event for more 
than the interest of the insured."124 This phrase should bolster the broad 
evidence rule and allow the admission of a demolition contract or an 
order of condemnation to limit the amount of recovery on a building 
destroyed by fire before commencement of the demolition. The same 
court that gave birth to the McAnarney rule, however, denied ad-
missibility of such evidence. As the court in Federowicz v. Potomac In-
surance Co. 125 stated: "[McAnarney] ... construed that portion of the 
policy providing that insurance was afforded to the extent of the actual 
cash value of the property."126 Furthermore, it explained: "Once it is 
found that the plaintiff had an insurable interest at the time of the fire 
he is entitled to recover the value of the building as it stood, without 
regard to the fact that he might shortly thereafter be required to 
remove it."127 The Federowicz court reviewed the history of the perti-
nent phrase, tracing the appropriate wording in the 1887 and 1917 stan-
dard forms which were forerunners of the 1943 form, and concluded that 
the pertinent deletions and additions did not alter the determinants af-
fecting the amount of loss: 
[T]he pertinent clause in the policy should be interpreted upon the 
basis that this was insurance against physical loss and not against 
financial loss. The contract was one of insurance against loss by fire 
to a building owned by plaintiff. It was not an agreement to indem-
nify him to the extent of his financialloss.128 
McAnarney supports the financial loss theory, and the replacement cost 
less depreciation rule expresses the physical loss theory. Therefore, the 
court in Federowicz retreated from the McAnarney position.129 
within the framework of the present wording of the standard insuring clause. For the text 
of this clause, see note 88 supra. 
122 Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Gulf Breeze Cottages, Inc., 38 So. 2d 828, 830 (Fla. 1949). 
123 See text accompanying notes 117-18 supra. 
1
:u 1943 N.Y. Standard Policy, supra note 38, § 1, pt. 6. For the remainder of the restric-
tive language, see note 88 supra. 
125 7 A.D.2d 330, 183 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1959). 
1
'" Id. at 332-33, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 118. 
121 Id. at 334, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 119. 
128 Id. at 336, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 121. 
129 It is interesting to note that there is a dearth of cases where the phrase "nor in any 
event for more than the interest of the insured" is at issue. It receives cursory attention in 
a few cases, but the courts reach the same result in determining actual cash value as if the 
phrase were not in the policy. New Jersey, however, does give effect to the phrase and 
distinguishes between an ownership interest and a creditor interest. When an ownership in-
terest is involved, the New Jersey courts apply the physical loss theory giving the insured 
. recovery for the full value of the property and not merely his financial interest therein. See 
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Valued Policies 
Valued policies, relative to the concept of indemnity, present another 
aspect of valuation. In a valued policy, the value of the subject covered 
by the policy is, in case of total loss, fixed by the terms of the contract 
or by statutory requirement.130 The amount of recovery is not determined 
according to the actual loss;131 in fact, absent fraud, no proof of loss is 
necessary132 since the value of the property is immaterial.133 Thus, the 
temptation on the part of the insured to overvalue is great, and cases in-
volving such situations are many. Absent fraud, the courts allow 
recovery according to the amount in the insurance policy .134 
Coinsurance 135 
A coinsurance clause provides that unless the insured has provided 
insurance on the property covered by the policy in an amount which is 
at least a specific percentage (usually 80%) of the value of the property, 
the insured will bear a pro rata share of any loss.136 Although, at first 
Cooke v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 119 N.J. Super. 248, 291 A.2d 24 (1972). In Flint Frozen Foods, 
Inc. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 8 N.J. 606, 86 A.2d 673 (1952), however, the court denied recovery 
for destroyed goods held as collateral security after the insured creditor had been fully paid 
by the debtor. Since the debt had been extinguished, the creditor did not incur a los~. 
In McWilliams v. Farm & City Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 248 Iowa 233, 80 N.W.2d 320 (1957), the 
court without discussion reached the financial loss result, stating: "Where the contract, as 
here, is limited to 'the interest of the insured in the property' it simply assures reimburse· 
ment for his actual loss not exceeding a stated sum." !d. at 235, 80 N.W.2d at 322. 
130 Many states have enacted valued policy statutes. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE§ 412 (West 
1972); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 40·905 (1973); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 26-03-03 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3929.25 (Page Supp. 1980). 
"' See, e.g., Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. James, 252 Ark. 638, 480 S.W.2d 341 (1972): 
Harvey v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 1967); Brooks Realty, Inc. v. 
Aetna Ins. Co., 276 Minn. 245, 149 N.W.2d 494 (1967); Zack Metal Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 26 
A.D.2d 54, 271 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1966): Loftis v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 54 Tenn. App. 371, 390 
S.W.2d 722 (1964): Trible v. Tower Ins. Co., 43 Wis. 2d 172, 168 N.W.2d 148 (1969). 
1
,. See Zuraff v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 252 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 1977): Commercial 
Union Ins. Co. of America v. Stanmike Inv. Co., 475 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). 
"" The rule for partial losses is generally the same under valued policies as under non· 
valued (open) policies, provided there are no specific statutory provisions regulating the 
matter. For a collection of cases involving partial loss, see Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 619 (1954). 
134 E.g., Harvey v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 689, 691 (La. App. 1967). 
135 A discussion of the reasons for the introduction of the coinsurance clause into land 
based casualty policies is not within the scope of this article. For a concise explanation, see 
R. KEETON. supra note 4, at 137-40. 
1
"' A coinsurance clause that has become known as the New York Standard Coinsurance 
Clause reads as follows: 
This company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss or damage 
to the property described herein than the sum hereby insured bears to the 
percentage specified on the first page of this policy of the actual cash value of 
said property at the time such loss shall happen, nor for more than the propor· 
tion which this policy bears to the total insurance thereon. 
R. KEETON, supra note 4, at 138. The operation of this clause may be illustrated as follows: 
468 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:445 
blush, it would appear that the coinsurance clause results in a deviation 
from the indemnity principle, further reflection indicates otherwise. The 
insured, for a commensurate premium adjustment, contractually binds 
himself to insure to a minimum amount; failing that, he voluntarily 
assumes the risk of becoming a coinsurer.137 
LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the preceding sections have demonstrated, many judicial decisions 
have deviated from the principle of indemnity. In various contexts, the 
courts have failed to evaluate the insured's insurable interest properly 
and have failed to establish the appropriate amount of recovery based 
upon the impairment of that interest which results from the occurrence 
of the insured-against event. The following recommendations should be 
adopted in order to eliminate such judicially created deviations from the 
principle of indemnity. In the life tenant and remainderman situation, 
the insurance proceeds should be either invested or used to rebuild the 
property. When the life tenant is required to keep the property insured 
and the insurance proceeds are used to rebuild the property, the life 
tenant will retain the use of the property and the remainderman will 
ultimately succeed thereto. If the proceeds are invested, the life tenant 
may use the income to rent a dwelling and the remainderman will suc-
ceed to the fund. In both situations, equity will be served; the life tenant 
will realize his expectancy since mere recovery of the present value of 
his life interest would not provide him with a home and the principle of 
indemnity will have been followed.138 If the life tenant and remainder-
Assume the value of the insured property at the time of the loss is $10,000, the coinsurance 
requirement is 80% and the actual insurance carried is $6,000. If damage occurs to the ex-
tent of $4,000, how much will the insured recover? The minimum requirement of coverage 
is $8,000 (80% of $10,000); therefore, the insured will recover his proportionate share of the 
$4,000, that is, $3,000: ($6,000/$8,000) x $4,000 ,; $3,000. The coinsurance clause is effective 
only when the loss is partial. For a total loss, the insured will recover the face value of the 
policy, since that amount will always be less than his proportionate amount would have 
been. If the loss had been total in the above illustration, the formula would have worked 
out: ($6,000/$8,000) x $10,000 = $7,500. Since his coverage is only $6,000, that is all that the 
insured will recover. For other examples, seeR. KEETON, supra note 4, at 138-40: · 
131 The coinsurance clause can become a trap for the unwary. The value to which the 
clause refers is the value at the time of the loss. See note 136 supra. During inflationary 
periods, it is possible for the value of the property to rise sufficiently between the inception 
of the policy and the time of loss to trigger the clause. One way to overcome this problem is 
to have an inflation endorsement attached to the policy, whereby the company will 
automatically increase the amount of coverage each year by a certain percentage in ex-
change for an additional premium, thereby relieving the owner from having to redetermine 
the amount of insurance that he will need to carry. For other solutions, see R. KEETON, 
supra note 4, at 139-40 . 
... 
The very foundation ... of every rule which has been applied to insurance law 
is this, namely, that the contract of insurance contained in a marine or fire 
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man acquire separate insurances on the property, the loss should be ap-
portioned between the insurers and the proceeds applied as suggested. 
In the cases involving lessees and lessors, the statutory scheme 
should provide for distribution of the loss consonant with the various 
obligations and relationships under the lease and insurance policies 
covering the risk. If the lessee is obligated to repair or replace under 
the lease and only the lessee insures the improvements, the lessee's in-
surer should bear the loss without regard being given to the term re-
maining. If, on the other hand, the lessor was the only one to insure the 
improvements, the lessor's insurer and the lessee should apportion the 
loss.139 If the lessor and the lessee separately insure the improvements, 
the two insurers should apportion the loss. Where the lessor, rather 
than the lessee, is bound to repair or replace under the lease, the 
lessor's insurer should bear the loss when only the lessor insures the im-
provements, and the lessee's insurer and the lessor should apportion the 
loss when only the lessee insures the improvements. Again, if the lessor 
and lessee both insure the improvements, the two insurers would appor-
tion the loss. If the lease is silent regarding the obligation to repair or 
replace in case of damage and either the lessor or the lessee insured the 
improvements, the insurer should bear the loss without contribution 
from the uninsured party. If both parties insure the improvements, 
their insurance carriers should apportion the loss between 
themselves.140 
In automobile liability insurance policies, the spouse of the named in-
sured is, by definition, also a named insured. A similar device could be 
legislatively adopted to remedy the deviation from the principle of in-
demnity which occurs when one spouse insures property to which the 
other spouse holds title. Such a statutory solution would provide that in 
casualty policies on homesteads, both spouses are deemed named in-
sureds even though only one is actually named in the policy. Both 
spouses have an insurable interest in the home141 and the insurer would 
not be disadvantaged by such a requirement. 
A statutory solution to the demolition and condemnation case prob-
lems would be to require that evidence relative to the pending deJ!l~-li~ 
policy as a contract of indemnity, and of indemnity only, and that this contract 
means that the assured, in case of loss against which the policy has been made, 
shall be fully indemnified, but shall never be more than fully indemnified. 
Castellian v. Preston, 11 Q.B. 380, 386 (1883). 
1 
.. If two or more insurers sustain a loss on the same risk, they apportion the damages 
between them subject to the provisions of the "other insurance" clause in the contracts. 
Similarly, the lessee who assumed the obligation to repair or rebuild is a coinsurer. 
1
'" This discussion of statutory solutions to the issues raised in situations involving 
lessors and lessees considers only the contractual aspects of the problem. The lessor's or 
lessee's liability to the other for negligence is not within the scope of this article. In such 
situations, the rule of subrogation may affect the insurers' obligations. 
tu For a definition of "insurable interest," see note 3 supra. 
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tion contract and condemnation proceedings be admitted. The rule that 
the measure of damages is determined at the moment of loss and future 
events may not be considered is too inflexible and results in unrealistic 
recoveries. The broad evidence rule, coupled with the standard policy 
phrase "not in any event for more than the interest of the insured"142 
demands the admission of such evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The vast majority of claims for casualty losses involve property wholly 
owned by the insured and not involved in condemnation proceedings or 
demolition contracts. The measure of recovery in these cases conforms 
to the principles of indemnity, subject only to differences in dollar 
amount arising from the method of valuation used.143 Whether the loss is 
total or partial, depreciation is a factor which must be considered under 
any of these methods. The minority view which does not consider 
· depreciation in partial loss cases144 violates the principle of indemnity; 
the insured makes a profit on his loss, receiving something new for 
something that was old.145 
Claims involving property in which the insured has only a partial in-
terest also result in recoveries that violate the indemnity principle. 
Both a life tenant and a remainderman may recover the full value of the 
destroyed property.146 A lessee who has improved the demised premises 
may, in some states, recover the full value-not merely the present 
value-of the term even if the lessor repairs the damage.147 Some 
jurisdictions permit a husband who insures the wife's homestead prop-
erty in his sole name to recover the full value thereof.148 
The demolition and condemnation cases149 illustrate the most blatant 
judicial deviation from the principle of indemnity. In the former, the 
argument is that until demolition has begun, the insured is entitled to 
the value of the structure without regard to the pending demolition. 
Courts disregard the economic fact that a building about to be demolished 
is a liability rather than an asset because of the cost of demolition and 
142 1943 N.Y. Standard Policy, supra note 38, § 1, pt. 6. 
'" See text accompanying notes 97-137 supra. 
"' See text accompanying notes 121-22 supra. 
145 Insurance proceeds in a replacement cost contract enable the insured to repair or 
rebuild a damaged old building with new materials; thus, depreciation is not deducted. 
Premiums for such policies reflect the additional liability assumed by the insured: 
therefore, the questions of conformity to or violation of indemnity principles in such situa-
tions is not relevant to the issues discussed in this article. 
"" See text accompanying notes 21-29 supra. 
'" See text accompanying notes 30·45 supra. 
''" See text accompanying notes 46-52 supra. 
"" See text accompanying notes 85-96 supra. 
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removing debris and that the expectancy of any recovery for fire loss 
encourages arson. In condemnation cases, the judicial view that until 
condemnation has been completed the insured is entitled to recovery, 
gives the insured a windfall. 
In the cases involving vendors and vendees, the vendee benefits from 
the vendor's insurance.150 This disposition of the funds technically 
violates the principle of indemnity/51 yet any other course would be in-
equitable. If the vendor retained the insurance proceeds and also retained 
the sale price, he would receive a windfall. If the insurer were excused 
from paying because the vendor collected from the vendee, the insurer 
would receive a windfall. Crediting the proceeds to the purchase price is 
the most equitable solution. 
To eliminate these judicially created deviations from the fundamental 
principle of insurance law, that of indemnity, legislation is needed. The 
recommendations for legislative solutions which are outlined above pro-
vide a model for the equitable disposition of damages in each of these 
situations which conforms to the fundamental principle of indemnity. 
150 See text accompanying notes 61-84 supra. 
"' The principle of indemnity is violated because the vendee receives indemnification 
even though he does not carry any insurance on the property. 

